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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic regulation of technical innovation in free-market
economies has traditionally evolved from several different
directions at once, with parochial disregard for a more coherent approach to what has become a quintessentially transnational set of problems.' From one angle, intellectual property

1. See, e.g., Ernst-Ufrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the
GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal System, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 35, 35-41 (1993);
see also LINKING TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES-AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARI-
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rights derogate from the norms of free competition in order to
overcome the "public goods" problem inherent in the commercial exploitation of intangible creations and to elevate routine
technical skills to progressively higher levels.2 Within this
framework, state trade secret laws supplement federally granted exclusive property rights by providing some incentive to
develop incremental innovation that falls short of the
nonobviousness standard of patent law while discouraging
industrial espionage, unethical behavior and corruption.3 From
another angle, antitrust laws limit the exercise of proprietary
rights in patents, copyrights, trademarks, and industrial knowhow with a view to attenuating their anti-competitive effects.4
Unfair competition law, which prohibits acts that confuse and
deceive consumers, reinforces this pro-competitive goal and
sometimes enables courts to compensate for the inability of
legislators to keep pace with technological advancement in a
post-industrial economy.5 Given the different policy variables
at stake in each of these often competing legal subcultures,
and the conflicting interests of sovereign states at different

SON OF THE POLICIES OF INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS (Martha C. Harris & Gordon E.

Moore eds., 1992); INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: CONCEPTS, MEASURES
AND COMPARISONS (Nathan Rosenberg & Claudio Frischtak eds., 1985); GLOBAL
DIIENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

(Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT P. BENKO, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
-ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 17-19 (1987); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind,
An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3 (1991); Michael Lehmann, The Theory of Property Rights and the Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Property, 16 INTL REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. (IIC) 525 (1985); Michael Lehmann, Property and Intellectual Property-Property Rights as Restrictions on Competition in Furtherance of Competition,
20 IIC 1 (1989); see also infra note 188 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS
-NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 1617 (1975); David D. Friedman,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5
J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 70 (1991); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of
Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 683-93, 699-701, 711-23

(1980).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
LAW, chs. 11-38 (1993); 3 ROGER M. MILGRII, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 6.05

(1992); Valentine Korah, EEC Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 55 (1993).
5. See, e.g., LADAS, supra note 3, at 1675-1742; J. H. Reichman, Intellectual
Property in InternationalTrade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769-96 (1989) [hereinafter GATT Connection] (nonexistence
of an international norm against misappropriation).
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stages of development, it would be miraculous if the area of
convergence in which these laws interact were not plagued
with internal inconsistencies and contradictions.'
The changing nature of innovation under modern conditions, and the corresponding pressure such changes exert on
conventional assumptions about the nature of competition
itself,' have exacerbated this unsatisfactory state of affairs.
Almost without realizing it, let alone questioning it, traditional
legal lore has assumed that manufacturers of most unpatented
goods sold on the general products market can fend for themselves without governmental intervention to restrain the exercise of their competitors' legal rights to imitate.' To this end,
the patent system functions negatively by driving all unpatented innovation onto the general products market where free
competition prevails.9 In that arena, the innovator's very ability to survive depends on the natural lead time that results
from norms requiring competitors to reverse-engineer undisclosed know-how by fair rather than market-distorting
means." Yet, innovators who produce information-based
goods in a post-industrial economy encounter a chronic lack of
natural lead time in which to recoup their investment and to
accumulate profits for reinvestment in further innovation."
6. See, e.g., SPENCER W. WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST
LAW § 9.01 (1993).
7. See generally J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994) [hereinafter Legal Hy.
brids]; see also DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1-87 (William Kingston ed.,
1987); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
8. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,
305 U.S. 111 (1938). But see Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2753 (1992); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); International News Serv.
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918) (recognizing quasi-property interest in an intangible information product of creative effort, skill and investment).
See generally P. J. KAtFMANN, PASSING OFF AND MISAPPROPRIATION 3-4, 73-79
(1986); Leo J. Raskind, The MisappropriationDoctrine as a Competitive Norm of
Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991); Ralph S. Brown, Design
Protection:An Overview, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1357-58 (1987).
9. See generally GATT Connection, supra note 5, at 785-90 (negative mandate
of the patent system); Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to
Lear, 59 CAL. L. REV. 873 (1971).
10. See, e.g., UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. § 1(2) (1985); Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476, 490 (1974); Friedman, Landes &
Posner, supra note 3, at 70; see also infra text accompanying notes 29-39.
11. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-
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Their inability to compete under the standard operating assumptions of traditional legal regimes has led to a proliferation
of hybrid protectionist laws, 2 including statutory misappropriation laws prohibiting specific forms of slavish imitation,
3
such as those recently enacted in Switzerland and Japan.
The mixture of legal norms applicable to intellectual creations, including trade regulation laws, is thus evolving in two
opposing directions. One trend favors the reduction of marketdistorting practices that affect both domestic and international
trade in the traditional objects of protection;' 4 the other tends
to increase legal restraints on trade, including barriers to entry, affecting new objects of protection that would otherwise
have to endure the rigors of free competition. 5 Observers

How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research,
42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 648-69 (1989) [hereinafter Programs as Know-How]; J. H.
Reichman, Overlapping Proprietary Rights in University-Generated Research Products: The Case of Computer Programs, 17 COLUi.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 51, 78-93, 97110, 122-25 (1992) [hereinafter Overlapping ProprietaryRights]; see also infra notes
44-45 and accompanying text.
12. See Programs as Know-How, supra note 11, at 662-67 (describing "patchwork quilt of protective devices . . . that has strained the classical system of intellectual property law to the breaking point"); see also infra text accompanying notes
82-95.
13. See Loi f~d~rale contre la concurrence d~loyale de 19 d~cembre 1986 [Federal Law on Unfair Competition of December 19, 1986] (effective March 1, 1988)
(Switz.), translated in 27 INDUS. PROP. 1 (Laws & Treaties Supp. Sept. 1988);
INSTITUTE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [JAPAN], CONCERNING THE REVISION OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION PREVENTION LAW IN JAPAN 29-46 (1993) (instituting provi-

sions prohibiting slavish imitation of most product configurations for a period of
three years); see also Jean-Marc Mousseron, La Protection du Savoir-Faire (KnowHow), paper presented to the Seventh Annual Conference on "Doing Business
Abroad," University of Ottawa (Canada), Nov. 17, 1993.
14. See, e.g., HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION 1-76 (1993); Ralph
Oman, Berne Revision: The Continuing Drama, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA

& ENT. L.J. 139 (1993); Petersmann, supra note 1; J. H. Reichman, The TRIPS
Component of the GA7Ts Uruguay Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual
Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA

& ENT. L.J. 171 (1993) [hereinafter TRIPS Component]; see also Albert Tramposch,
Harmonization of Industrial Property Laws, paper presented to the Seventh Annual Conference on "Doing Business Abroad," University of Ottawa (Canada), Nov.
17, 1993.
15. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-The Outer Edge of
World Intellectual Property Law, 24 IIC 446 (1993) [hereinafter Electronic Information Tools]; J. H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law-A Comment, 4 FORDHAAI INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

387 (1993) [hereinafter Evolution of Design Protection]; see also Peter S. Menell,
An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1045 (1989); Dennis Kaijala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the
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must, therefore, take pains to distinguish traditional from
nontraditional objects of protection when evaluating current
developments, lest the drive for international harmonization of
intellectual property, unfair competition and even antitrust
laws 6 obscure the mounting anticompetitive effects of new
restraints on trade proliferating in all developed market economies.' 7
This Article does not address traditional antitrust concerns
that fall within the expertise of other participants in this Symposium. Rather, it first examines the pivotal role of reverseengineering under existing trade regulation laws and briefly
reviews some of the pressures undermining this concept in the
context of new technologies. 8 The Article then considers the
extent to which multilateral trade negotiations, within the
framework of the GATT's Uruguay Round, 9 have harmonized
trade-regulation measures affecting the exercise of traditional
intellectual property rights ° while largely ignoring the systemic vulnerability of unpatented, noncopyrightable embodiments of advanced scientific and technical know-how to freeriding appropriation. 2' The study closes with some preliminary findings from works-in-progress suggesting that direct
protection of applied know-how in an integrated world economy
will require a new intellectual property paradigm capable of
assimilating regulatory approaches that have been artificially
disarticulated behind the lines of demarcation separating traditional legal subcultures.

New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 33 (1987); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine
Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663.
16. See supra note 14.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 82-103.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 23-45.
19. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GATT Doe. MTN/FA/Add.1 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Uruguay Round Final Act].
20. See infra text accompanying notes 104-57.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 186-97.
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II. INTERACTION BETWEEN
TRADE

REGULATION

LAWS

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
IN INNOVATION-BASED MARKET

ECONOMIES

By providing exclusive property rights in return for the
production of scarce intellectual goods, statutory intellectual
property law seeks to overcome the risk of market failure that
inheres in public goods generally and to ensure that free-riders
do not appropriate the benefits that would otherwise accrue to
investors in research and development. The positive role of
these disciplines is widely acknowledged despite a lack of empirical support. 3 Nevertheless, policymakers concerned to
promote investment in important new technologies often overstate the supposed benefits of specific intellectual property
regimes while ignoring the negative economic functions of
these regimes in relation to the complementary operations of
competition law generally. If it was true that intellectual property laws balanced incentives to create against opportunities to
compete in the specialized markets for qualifying intellectual
goods, a healthy by-product of these laws was that courts and
legislators traditionally drove nonqualifying intellectual goods
onto the general products market where free competition prevailed. The negative economic functions of a mature patent
system, for example, have been summarized in the following
terms:

23. See supra note 2; infra note 188 and accompanying text; see also ROBERT
MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY-CASES AND MATERIALS 766-77 (1992);
Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of ConP.

sistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1343 (1989). Patents, for example, stimulate disclosure of major discoveries and, to a lesser extent,
copyrights stimulate publication of artistic works. Both patents and copyrights
overcome risk aversion in prospecting for path-breaking discoveries or for artistic
works that capture the public's fancy. Exclusive property rights also facilitate a
reasonably efficient allocation of resources to the task of transferring scientific
breakthroughs to industry or of organizing costly public disseminations of artistic
works whose commercial values cannot be determined in advance. See, e.g.,
Edmund W. Kitch, Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265 (1977); Besen & Raskind, supra note 2. Resistance to traditional intellectual
property rights tends, accordingly, to stress overriding limitations and exemptions
that reflect the public interest in balancing incentives to create against the
competitors' rights to imitate and improve upon new intellectual creations. See,
e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT. PRINCIPLES,
LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.1 (1989 & SUPP. 1993); L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY
LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT-A LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS 193-213 (1991).
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1. Nonpatented innovations remain subject to price competition and are free to imitate if disclosed;
2. Undisclosed, unpatentable innovations are free to reverse engineer but not to steal;
3. Patented inventions are not infringed by nonequivalent
innovation;
4. Unfair competition law may not repress product imitation in the absence of confusion.2 4
The critical attention lately paid to positive intellectual
property law also tends to obscure three major functions of
trade regulation law in market economies that are driven by
constant technological innovation. First, unfair competition law
as expressed in the norms governing trade secrets and confidential information actually determines the pace and direction
of routine innovation."
Second, unfair competition law
strives-often unsuccessfully-to overcome the market failure
likely to result from an imbalance between legal incentives to
create and the public's right to compete, especially when specific applications of intellectual property law appear to threaten
chronic under-investment in high-risk research and development.2 6 Third, principles drawn from antitrust law determine
overriding public-interest limitations on contractual exercises
of the exclusive rights that intellectual property laws provide."

24. Legal Hybrids, supra note 7; see also supra notes 2, 3, 8 & 23. The negative economic premises underlying copyright law can be summarized as follows: 1)
Noncopyrightable productions or components thereof remain subject to price competition and are free to imitate if disclosed; 2) Nonprotectable ideas underlying clusters of independent creation are free to use but not to steal (built-in reverse-engineering); 3) Cultural policy not applicable to general products market; 4) Unfair
competition law not to limit users' rights in the absence of confusion. Legal Hybrids, supra note 7.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 28-39.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 40-45.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 46-81.
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A. Pivotal Role of Reverse-Engineering in Classical Trade
Regulation Law
1. Competition Presupposes Natural Lead Time
While providing temporary monopolies to stimulate the
production of high-risk, intangible creations, intellectual property law supplies statutory periods of artificial lead time to
compensate, at least in part, for the loss of natural lead time
that occurs when intellectual goods are subject to rapid imitation.28 When no statutory exclusive rights apply, the availability of natural lead time largely depends on unfair competition norms operating through laws protecting trade secrets and
confidential information. What seems insufficiently understood
is that these laws determine the pace and direction of competition based on ordinary or routine skills by requiring second
comers to reverse-engineer undisclosed, unpatented innovation
by proper means.
Unpatented, noncopyrightable technologies may qualify for
protection under state trade secret laws in the United States"
or under the common law of confidential information in both
the United States3 and the United Kingdom. Trade secret
laws generally cover "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information"3 3 that confers a business advantage over

28. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, Design Protection and the New Technologies: The
United States Experience in a Transnational Perspective, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 8,
17, 134-45 (1989/1990), [hereinafter Designs and New Technologies].
29. The term "ordinary competition" refers to all the products and processes of
routine innovation-incremental innovation-that the patent system, with its stiff
test of nonobviousness, negatively subjects to free competition. See 35 U.S.C. § 103
(1988 & Supp. 1993); supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
160 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); 2 MILGIM,
supra note 4, § 7.08.
31. See, e.g., Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1453-56
(11th Cir. 1991) (preemption of trade secret claim by federal patent law, which
gave right to reverse engineer on facts as stated, did not necessarily preclude
liability for breach of confidence based on expectations of the parties); JAY
DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 4.05 (1)(b)-(c) (1993).
32. See, e.g., W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,
TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 215-19 (2d ed. 1989); FRANCIS GURRY, BREACH
OF CONFIDENCE 90-97 (1984); see also ALLISON COLEMAN, THE LEGAL PROTECTION
OF TRADE SECRETS 8-9 (1992). For the situation in other countries prior to the
GATT's Uruguay Round, see, e.g., LADAS, supra note 3, at 1616-74.
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
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competitors, so long as it is sufficiently definite and not commonly known in the trade, and so long as reasonable precautions are taken to preserve its secrecy.' Assuming that a given discovery fits within the operative definition of a trade
secret, such eligibility confers no exclusive rights to make, use,
sell or reproduce it in the manner of patents or of other statutory intellectual property rights." Rather, third-party acquisition of secret knowledge becomes actionable only when obtained by improper means, that is to say, in ways that are excluded by private agreement or that violate a confidential relationship or that otherwise offend public policy. Trade secrets
that are voluntarily revealed, insufficiently guarded or reverseengineered by proper means lose all protection and become
subject to free competition.36
Third parties seeking to compete effectively will thus have
to reverse-engineer the originator's undisclosed know-how
underlying a new but unpatented product or process; establish
autonomous modes of production; develop effective lines of
distribution; and establish their own reputations as producers
of quality goods. Because this task of catching up to the
originator's head start takes time and costs money, it presumably endowed traditional innovators with a period of natural
lead time in which to gain a foothold on the market.37 Competition under standard nineteenth century conditions was thus
rooted in the natural lead time that trade secret law initially
provided and in the ability of consumers to identify the sources
of innovative products that trademark law later provided."

34. Id.; UTSA, supra note 10, § 1(4); Rockwell Graphic Sys. v. DEV Indus.,
925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).
35. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476, 490 (1974);
Rockwell, 925 F.2d at 179 (suggesting that a theory that gave the trade secret
holder a property right valid against the world would be preempted by the federal
patent statute).
36. See, e.g., UTSA, supra note 10, § 1(2); DRATLER, supra note 31,
§ 4.04(2); COLEMAN, supra note 32, at 25.
37. See, e.g., HANNS ULLRICH, STANDARDS OF PATENTABILITY FOR EUROPEAN
INVENTIONS: SHOULD AN INVENTIVE STEP ADVANCE THE ART? 106 (1977); Brown,
supra note 8, at 1388 ("The originator will have had a head start. That is often
the only advantage our system grants . . . and it is often enough.").
38. See, e.g., Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note 3; William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON.
265, 297-306 (1987); see also LADAS, supra note 3, at 967-68.
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These laws are, in turn, merely specialized and, often, codified
functions of the general law of unfair competition. 9
2. Contraction of Natural Lead Time in the
Commercialization of Applied Scientific Know-How
In practice, the mesh between intellectual property law
and the laws governing confidentiality and trade secrets was
imperfect even during the nineteenth century, when traditional
forms of engineering occupied the forefront of attention and
clear lines still separated theoretical from applied science" as
well as industrial from artistic property laws. 4 Of particular
concern in this period were commercial designs, both aesthetic
and functional in nature, whose creative contribution is usually embodied in products sold on the general products market. Because neither classical intellectual property law nor
classical trade secret law guaranteed industrial designers sufficient lead time against slavish duplication, free-riding second
comers could appropriate the benefits accruing from investment in innovative design without contributing to the costs of
research and development. As a result, both statutory intellectual property laws and the general laws of unfair competition
are still struggling to fill this gap in most industrialized countries.4"

39. See, e.g., FRANQOIS DESSEMONTET, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF KNOW-HOW
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 11-48, 322-53 (2d ed. 1976).

40. See Allan Newell, The Models Are Broken, The Models are Broken!, 47 U.
PITT. L. REv. 1023, 1026, 1033 (1986) (discussing the breakdown of this distinction); Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 195 (1987); Electronic Information Tools, supra
note 15, at 472-75.
41. See, e.g., Legal Hybrids, supra note 7, passim (documenting and diagnosing
breakdown of historical demarcation line separating industrial from artistic property).
42. See generally Designs and New Technologies, supra note 28, at 126-36,
138-45.
43. See, e.g., Overlapping Proprietary Rights, supra note 11, at 110-21 (discussing hybrid laws protecting aesthetic and functional designs as well as integrated circuit designs); Designs and New Technologies, supra note 28, at 8-11 (foreign design laws), 37-42 (foreign utility model laws contrasted with domestic design patent law), 81-123 (concurrent protection of trade dress: the judge-made
design law); see also Evolution of Design Protection, supra note 15, at 392-97 (updating and criticizing broad protection of product configurations as appearance
trade dress under Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988)); J. H.
Reichman, Design Protection and the Legislative Agenda, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
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By now it has become evident that today's information
technologies, together with other important new technologies,
such as integrated circuit designs and biogenetic engineering,
slip through the cracks between intellectual property law and
trade secret law into that same netherworld of chronically
insufficient lead time that previously engulfed industrial art.
Several articles have analyzed this phenomenon, which typically concerns incremental innovation bearing know-how on its
face.' Stated simply, today's most valuable technologies often
fail to meet the nonobvious standard of patent law because
they partake of merely incremental advances beyond the prior
art, while their functional character remains alien to both the
spirit and economic assumptions of copyright law, which implements cultural rather than industrial policies. Yet, such technologies obtain little or no natural lead time in classical trade
secret law because they consist essentially of intangible scientific or technical know-how that becomes embodied in products
sold on the open market. Any third parties who obtain the
tangible products can quickly duplicate the valuable information they contain and thereby appropriate the fruits of the
innovator's investment in research and development, with no
corresponding investment of their own. Under modern conditions, in other words,
a major problem with the kinds of innovative know-how underlying important new technologies is that they do not lend
themselves to secrecy even when they represent the fruit of
enormous investment in research and development. Because
third parties can rapidly duplicate the embodied information
and offer virtually the same products at lower prices than
those of the originators, there is no secure interval of lead
time in which to recuperate the originators' initial investment or their losses from unsuccessful essays, not to mention
the goal of turning a profit.45
PROBS. 281-82, 290-96 (1992) [hereinafter Legislative Agenda].
44. See, e.g., Programs as Know-How, supra note 11, at 648-69; Electronic

Information Tools, supra note 15, at 468-74; see also Pamela Samuelson, Benson
Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer
Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1148-53 (1990).
45. Reichman, Designs and New Technologies, supra note 28, at 137. 'From a
behavioral standpoint, investors in applied scientific know-how find the copyright
paradigm attractive because of its inherent disposition to supply artificial lead
time to all comers without regard to innovative merit and without requiring originators to preselect the products that are most worthy of protection." Id. at 144.
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3. Pressures on the Doctrine of Misuse
Trade regulation law has typically sought either to prevent
abusive extensions of the patent monopoly and of other statutory intellectual property rights4" or to defend the public's
right to use unpatented (or no-longer-patented) innovation
against either state legislation or private contractual agreements that unduly limit that right.47 In the United States,
critical attention focuses mainly on the soundness of applying
antitrust principles to limit the exercise of statutory monopolies in ways that appear to undermine the intended balance
between protection and free competition.48 The tendency is to
apply a rule of reason-rather than per se restraints-in most
cases. 49 The extent to which courts can strike down allegedly
See also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942)
(tying); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (first sale); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950) (package licenses);
see generally Leo J. Raskind, Licensing Under United States Antitrust Law, 20
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 49 (1994); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A
Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1984); see also WARD S. BOWMAN, PATENT
AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL (1973).
47. See, e.g., Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S.
637 (1947) (grant-back clauses); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (invalidating patent term extension by private agreement); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S.
653 (1969), criticized in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 U. VA. L. REV. 677 (1986); Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (invalidating state law prohibiting use of plug-mold method of reverse-engineering unpatented design). But
see Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (upholding hybrid preapplication royalty agreement imposing lesser royalties if patent failed to issue).
See generally MERGES, supra note 23, at 898-900 (discussing immutable limits on
"contracting around the patent code").
48. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 46, passim; Mark A. Lemley, The Economic
Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990). See also
Christian C. Taylor, No Challenge Termination Clauses: Incorporating Innovation
Policy and Risk Allocation into Patent Licensing Law, 69 IND. L.J. 215 (1993);
Michael P. Chu, Note, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave of Predatory Patent
Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (1992); A. Samuel Oddi,
Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U.
PrIT. L. REV. 73 (1982).
49. See, e.g., Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Windsurfing InVl, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Recent economic analysis questions the rationale behind holding any licensing practice per se anti-competitive"); WALLER, supra note 6, § 9.04 (suggesting that price
restraints may remain subject to per se constraints). See also Alan A. Geraldi,
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abusive licensing clauses without establishing full-fledged
violations of the antitrust laws has proved particularly controversial," while efforts to distinguish the principles applicable
to licenses of trade secrets from principles applicable to licenses of patents or of a mix of patents and trade secrets have
proved clumsy at best.5 Clumsier still, and even more controversial, is the extension of the misuse doctrine to unpatented
but copyrightable
forms of innovation, notably computer pro52
grams.

In the European Union, greater emphasis is placed on
"abuse of a dominant position" and on the need to improve the
free flow of goods between member states generally.53 In both

Misuse: An Equitable Defense to Intellectual Property Infringement Actions, 14
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J., 235, 240-43 (1992); Byron A. Bilicki, Note, Standard
Antitrust Analysis and the Doctrine of Patent Misuse: A Unification Under the Rule
of Reason, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 209 (1984).
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1986 & Supp. VI 1991), amended by Pub. L. No.
100-73, 102 Stat. 4674 (1988); USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, C.J.); MERGES, supra note 23, at 908-15 (linking distinctive doctrine of patent misuse under 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) with patentees' efforts to
broaden the scope of issued patents contractually). See also Martin J. Adelman,
Property Rights Theory and Patent Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 991-1013 (1977); Lemley, supra note 48.
51. See generally MILGRAM, supra note 4, § 6.05(4), et seq.; see also John W.
Ryan, The Treatment of TerritorialRestraints Under Patent and Know-How Licenses, 3 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 155 (1993); S. Stephen Hilmy, Note, Bonito Boats'
Resurrection of the Preemption Controversy: The Patent Leverage Charade and the
Lanham Act "End Around", 69 TEx. L. REV. 729, 750-53 (1991).
52. See, e.g., Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990);
Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Fox Software, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 831 (C.D. Cal. 1990);
Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
473 U.S. 908 (1985); see also Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510,
1523-24, 1529-30 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that attempts to monopolize the market
by making it impossible for others to compete violates purpose of copyright law,
and holding that use of trademark to exclude competitors from the market is
inconsistent with Lanham Act §§ 32(1)(a), 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)).
See generally Phillip Abromats, Note, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive Software Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. PITT. L.
REV. 630 (1991) [hereinafter Pittsburgh Note]; Scott A. Miskimon, Note, Divorcing
Public Policy from Economic Reality: The Fourth Circuit's Copyright Misuse Doctrine in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1672 (1991); Gary
Myers, Note, Tying Arrangements and the Computer Industry: Digidyne Corp. v.
Data General Corp, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1027.
53. See, e.g., VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC ColPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990); ISABELLE ROUDARD, DROIT EUROPEAN DES
LICENSES ExCLUSIVES DE BREVETS 98-199 (1989); Roger J. Gebel, The Interplay

Between Intellectual Property Rights and Free Movement of Goods in the European
Community, 4 FORDHAI INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 125 (1993).
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the European Union and Japan, considerable efforts are made
to encourage legal certainty by distinguishing permissible from
impermissible licensing clauses in the abstract.54 Formal distinctions between rules governing patent licenses and rules
applicable to know-how licenses have also received greater
attention in both the European Union55 and Japan56 than in
the United States.57 Nevertheless, these abstract criteria have
so far proved hard to apply with any degree of coherence,58
and in Europe at least, a more laissez-faire attitude may presage a drift toward more rule of reason analysis in practice,
with its attendant uncertainties. 59
In the rest of the world, a much broader notion of abuse,
traditionally centering on obligations to work patents locally,

54. See, e.g., TERUO DOi, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT-LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN 303, 309-25 (1992); Fair Trade Commission
[Japan], Japan: Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices With Respect to Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements, 21 IIC 662 (1990); Korah,
supra note 4.
55. See, e.g., GUILLERMO CABANELLAS & JOSE MASSAGUER, KNOW-HOW AGREEMENTS AND EEC COAPETITION LAW 65-242 (1991); VALENTINE KORAH, KNOW-HOW
LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES-REGULATION 556/89
(1989) [hereinafter KNOW-HOW LICENSING]; J. PAGENBERG & B. GEISSLER, LICENSE
AGREEMENTS-PATENTS, UTILITY MODELS, KNOW-HoW, COMPUTER SOFTWARE (2d ed.
1989).
56. See, e.g., DOI, supra note 54, at 325-40; Yoshio Ohara, New Japanese
Guidelines for the Regulation of Restrictive Clauses in Patent and Know-How Licensing Agreements, 21 IIC 645 (1990).
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Hanns Ullrich, Patents and Know-How, Free Trade,
Interenterprise Cooperation and Competition Within the Internal European Market,
23 IIC 583, 604 (1992) (stating that the "question of whether, how, and to what
extent this rationale of industrial property may also justify restraints of trade in
the context of the contractual (rather than the individual) exploitation of the exclusive right is a matter of permanent controversy"); Hans-Werner Moritz, Assignment
of Computer Software for Use on a Data Processing System and the Applicability
of Know-How Licensing Rules, 21 IIC 799 (1990); Ronald E. Myrick, Influences
Affecting the Licensing of Rights in a Unitary European Market, 4 FORDHAAI
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 81, 96-123 (1993); see also Bradley J. Nicholson,
Japanese Fair Trade Commission Guidelines for Licensing Agreements: An Overview
and a Critique, 21 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 2 (1991); Moritz R6ttinger, The Exhaustion of Copyright-Copyright and the Rules on the Free Movement of Goods,
157 REvUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR (R.I.D.A.) 50 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Ben Smulders, European Community Competition Law and Licensing Agreements, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 25 (1994) (discussing proposed modifications of the block exemptions); Korah, supra note 4, at 79-80 (acknowledging a
more laissez-faire attitude and preferring more rule of reason, but conceding "that
is not the European way"); Ullrich, supra note 58 (acknowledging need for overhaul, but preferring rules that provide more certainty).
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prevailed in both domestic and international laws, at least
prior to the GATT's Uruguay Round." Developing countries
continue to emphasize these broader notions of abuse in connection with their concern to promote a more effective transfer
of technology from developed to developing countries."'
This is not the place to evaluate the relative merits of
these different approaches. The point worth stressing here is
that none of them seems likely to succeed when extended more
or less uncritically to new technologies that fit imperfectly
within the patent and copyright paradigms to begin with.62
For example, the vulnerability of packaged software to
decompilation has led producers to impose stringent licensing
restrictions on vendees and users that greatly constrain both
the user's right to make additional copies and the purchaser's
freedom to reverse-engineer.' Unlike patents, however, which
last seventeen to twenty years, copyrights last from seventyfive to one hundred years.' Moreover, fears that innovation
may lag without strong protection of functional works has
tempted some courts to expand the copyright owner's exclusive
right to prepare derivative works to the point where it indirectly protects ideas, systems, processes, and other formally
inelligible matter.65 As a result, other courts hostile to this
60. See TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 204-10; infra text accompanying
notes 110-23.
61. See, e.g., Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/TOT/47
(1985) [hereinafter Draft TOT Code]; MICHAEL BLAKENY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 96-97 (1989); GUILLERIno
CABANELLAS, ANTITRUST AND DIRECT REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTIONS (1984); WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, THE DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (1980).
62. See generally Programs as Know-How, supra note 11, at 648-62; see also
John H. Barton, Robert B. Dellenbach & Paul Kuruk, Toward a Theory of Technology Licensing, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195 (1988).
63. See, e.g., Lasercomb America Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir.
1990); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) (construing 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988)); see also PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 23, at
193-213 (distinguishing personal use from fair use); David A. Rice, Public Goods,
Private Contract, and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 543, 595-621 (1992).
64. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
65. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 103, 106(2) (1988); Electronic Information Tools,
supra note 15, at 456-61 ("the derivative work at odds with information technologies"). See also Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1992).
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trend may find grounds for extending the doctrine of misuse to
licenses of copyrighted computer programs and of certain other
unpatented technologies that would remain independently
valid" even if the misuse doctrine as applied to patents were
questionable in the absence of a full-fledged antitrust violation."1 This said, the leading judicial decision applying traditional misuse doctrines to copyrighted computer software may
have painted with too broad a brush to inspire confidence.
The legal protection of databases and other factual works
raises additional problems that will not prove easy to resolve.
For example, when publishers need to rely on copyright law,
they may not meet the requirements of creative authorship at
all,69 and even if they do, their copyrights may not prevent
third parties from freely using the disparate facts presented in
a protected compilation. 0 At the same time, publishers of
some electronic information tools have imposed two-party licensing agreements that subordinate even the use of disseminated, uncopyrightable information to harsh terms and restrictions that appear inconsistent with the balance of public and
private interests achieved under copyright laws. 7 '
Because subscribers entering any on-line database must
log in and out, the proprietors' physical control over the data

66. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs,
47 U. PITr. L. REV. 1119, 1127-29 (1986); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the United States
and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L. J. 25, 60-65, 87-99 (1993).
67. Cf. Lemley, supra note 48; MERGES, supra note 23, at 898-900; see also
Thomas M. Susman, Tying, Refusals to License, and Copyright Misuse: The Patent
Misuse Model, 36 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 300 (1989).
68. Lasercomb America Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); see
supra note 52.
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(b) (1988); J.H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright
Law: A Realist's Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943, 949-55
(1991) (book review).
70. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see,
e.g., Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331
(1992); L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the
Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 385
(1992); Dennis S. KaIjala, Copyright and Misappropriation,17 U. DAYTON L. REV.
885 (1992); see generally Symposium, Copyright Protection For Computer Data Bases, CD-ROMS and Factual Compilations, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 323 (1992).
71. See, e.g., U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, FINDING A
BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 166-79 (1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT 19921.
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may enable them to charge for each and every use of electronically processed information. This includes uses like those customarily regarded as privileged, such as the making of copies
for personal use or for research purposes. 2 Yet, such practices
disregard the fact that copyright law as such does not protect
against end use in general nor does it prevent the use of disparate facts in particular. 3 Even when dissemination occurs in
hard copy form, such as a CD-ROM, digital technology enables
originators who constantly update the data to charge, directly
or indirectly, for all uses and to impose harsh contractual conditions in two-party agreements that largely fall outside of the
domestic copyright laws. The privatization of information without safeguards to foster certain socially beneficial uses of infor-

mation at acceptable costs could thus retard technological
progress. It remains to be seen whether courts and legislators
can devise unconventional public policy limitations on both the
statutory protection and private licensing of computerized
databases irrespective of the traditional statutory norms of
copyright law or the doctrine of misuse.'

72. OTA REPORT, supra note 71; Thomas J. DeLoughry, Computers and Copyrights-U.S. Panel Hears Differing Views on How to Protect Intellectual Property in
Electronic Era, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 24, 1993, at A15-A16; see also
PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 23, at 193-213.
73. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text; 17 U.S.C. §§ 109(a), 202
(1988); Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection:A Search for Principled
Standards, 70 MINN. L. REv. 579, 588-89 (1985) [hereinafter Principled Standards]
74. See J.H. Reichman, Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries as Competitors in an Integrated World Market, U.N. Conference on
Trade and Development, Discussion Paper No. 73, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/OSG/DP/73
(1993) at 24-26 (suggesting that answers to some of these questions may come
from agencies in developing countries). In the European Union, competition law recently prevented the publishers of copyrighted listings of daily television programs
from refusing to license other publishers seeking to produce comprehensive weekly
television guides covering the United Kingdom and Ireland. This ruling emerged
from three decisions that are collectively referred to as the Magill Case. See Case
T-69/89, RTE v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-485, 4 C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance 1991); Case T-70/89, BBC v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 11-535, 4 C.M.L.R.
669 (Ct. First Instance 1991); and Case T-76/89, ITP v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R.
11-575, 4 C.M.L.R. 745 (Ct. First Instance 1991), discussed in Smulders, supra note
59, at 37 n.61. But what if the daily television listings in question were not copyrightable subject matter, as might have occurred in the United States after the
Supreme Court's decision in Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct.
1282 (1991)? Would a refusal to license similar data by similarly situated publishers escape judicial or administrative scrutiny merely because the proprietors possessed no statutory grant of exclusive property rights?
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The vulnerability of new technologies to rapid appropriation by free-riders also skews the Supreme Court's efforts to
defend the public's right to reverse-engineer unpatented innovation within the parameters set by Brulotte, Aronson and
Bonito Boats."5 Legal restrictions on the licensing of technological know-how that made perfect sense under nineteenth
century conditions may prove inefficient when entrepreneurs
faced with a chronic sh6rtage of natural lead time fear to invest in the kind of research and development that yields unpatentable products and processes worth copying. By the same
token, if neither state nor federal law prevents rapid duplication of advanced technical know-how that does not lend itself
to trade secret protection, the end result could discourage,
rather than encourage, that very competitive process the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats uncritically sought to vindicate.76
As manufacturers struggle to overcome the know-how gap
that persists at the very core of the world's intellectual property system, notwithstanding the TRIPS component of the
GATT's Uruguay Round,77 they will tend to impose contractual limits on their licensees' power to reverse-engineer or otherwise exploit the licensors' unpatented know-how that exceed
the normative limits of traditional intellectual property and
antitrust laws. Yet, it is the very failure of the world's intellectual property system to address the problem of incremental
innovation bearing know-how on its face78 that makes such
defensive contractual measures both necessary and, depending
on the facts, sometimes economically reasonable as well. In
75. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156-57
(1989) (reaffirming that trade-secret licensing agreements cannot "substantially
impede" the policy goals of the federal patent system by providing post-expiration
"patent-like protection to intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law"); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S.
257 (1979); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see also Span-Deck, Inc. v.
Fab-Can, Inc., 677 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982);
Hilmy, supra note 51, at 749-53.
76. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 141 (holding that state plug-mold statute could
not prevent third-party from reproducing advanced design of boat hull by direct
molding process under Sears-Compco); Gordon, supra note 7 (discussing concept of
"malcompetitive copying"); see also Designs and New Technologies, supra note 28,
at 111-23; John S. Wiley, Bonito Boats: Uninformed But Mandatory Innovation

Policy, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. 283 (1989).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
78. See, e.g., Electronic Information Tools, supra note 15, at 468-75 ("information as applied know-how"); see infra text accompanying notes 177-84.
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seeking to promote competition, one cannot automatically apply traditional notions of misuse to new technologies without
risk of worsening the potential market failure inherent in a
chronic shortage of natural lead time.79
Legislators seeking to identify and address the root causes
of the crisis facing the world's intellectual property system
need to resist makeshift solutions that either distort established legal paradigms devised for different social purposes or
add to the proliferation of hybrid protectionist regimes being
thrown at a moving target." In the meanwhile, application of
the misuse doctrine to the licensing of new technologies will
raise questions for which there are few reliable precedents. If
the situation nonetheless mandates that some action be taken,
courts and administrators must take pains to distinguish between old and new objects of regulatory concern and must not
assume that principles suitable for the former will yield satisfactory results when applied to the latter. Otherwise, uncritical application of traditional legal doctrines will lead these
same courts down a zig-zag path between intermittent states
of excessive intervention and mindless judicial restraint.8 1
B. The Competitive Ethos Endangeredfrom Within
Responding to the lack of protection for applied scientific
know-how as such, governments have tended either to deform
the patent and copyright laws in an effort to accommodate
subject matter for which the classical regimes are inherently
unsuited or to multiply hybrid legal regimes granting exclusive
property rights to unpatentable innovation that has nowhere
else to go. Both tendencies generate cumulative protectionist
effects that offset the long-term competitive gains expected
from major harmonization exercises, including the results of
multilateral trade negotiations embodied in the TRIPS component of the GATT's Uruguay Round."

79. See supra text accompanying notes 29, 44-45.
80. See, e.g., Overlapping ProprietaryRights, supra note 11, at 53-57, 60-65,
110-23; infra text accompanying notes 83-95.
81. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989); cf. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (criticized
in Evolution of Design Law, supra note 15, at 392-97). See also Evolution of Design Law, supra note 15, at 387-92 (describing recurring cyclical pattern in world.
wide design protection law).
82. See Uruguay Round Final Act, supra note 19, Agreement on Trade-Related
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Under the rubric of recent developments, for example, one
may note a revived interest in the patenting of computer programs83 (despite a successful campaign to bring software
within the Berne Convention on the excuse that patents were
unavailable); 4 a legislative proposal to lower the
nonobviousness standard for biogenetic processes affecting
recombinant DNA in the United States; and a proposal to
protect noncopyrightable databases under sui generis regimes
in the European Union. 8 The protection of plant varieties
internationally has shifted from a modified copyright approach
to a modified patent approach without elevating the prerequisites of eligibility, just when most developing countries will
find themselves obliged to protect plant varieties under the
TRIPS Agreement. 7
To complete the picture, one should recall that the protection of innovative functional designs under patent-like standards in the utility model laws some countries enacted a long
time ago 8 has given way to mandatory protection of virtually
all integrated circuit designs on modified copyright principles
in countries adhering to the GATT. 9 This, in turn, has led

Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
MTN/FA II-AIC (1993) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
83. See, e.g., OTA REPORT 1992, supra note 71, at 23-35, 51-56; COMPUTER
SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE 31-38, 6266 (1991).
84. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 10(1); Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(1), 828 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter Berne Convention]; TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 198-203,
229-35.
85. See S. 8815, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (a proposed statute that would
overturn In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985), by amending the Patent
Code to provide that a biotechnology process for making or using a product may
be considered nonobvious if the starting material or resulting product is novel and
nonobvious); see also Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation Into the ProcrusteanBed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1991).
86. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Databases, COM(93)342 final [hereinafter EC Proposed Directive on Databases].
87. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 27 (3)(b); International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention), Dec. 2,
1961, as revised, Geneva, Oct. 23, 1978, 33 U.S.T. 2704, amended and opened for
signature March 19, 1991; TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 192-98, 246-47.
88. See, e.g., Electronic Information Tools, supra note 15, at 451-55 ('tool design in comparative industrial property law").
89. See Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits,
opened for signature May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477 [hereinafter Washington Trea-
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the United Kingdom to protect virtually all functional designs
in an unregistered design right, operating on modified copyright principles, that requires no appreciable creative contribution to qualify." A variant of the United Kingdom's unregistered design right has been endorsed by the Commission of the
European Union,9 and wholesale protection of functional designs in the European Union would increase the pressure on
the United States to follow suit. 2 Meanwhile, the United
States federal courts already protect product configurations for
an indefinite period of time under a spurious theory of "appearance trade dress;"93 the Swiss unfair competition law of
1986 permits innovators to interdict slavish imitation of technologically novel products until the costs of research and development have been recuperated;9 4 and the Japanese unfair
competition law of 1993 prohibits slavish imitation of most
product configurations for a period of three years.
These developments compromise the competitive ethos
from within. Traditionally, trade secrets laws invest competitors with an absolute right to imitate every unpatented,

noncopyrightable product provided they reverse-engineer its
innovative features by proper means. This is what SearsCompco and Bonito Boats continue to teach.96 Yet, every
ty]; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 35; TRIPS Component, supra note 14,
at 247-49.
90. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch 48, §§ 213-264 (Eng.); see,
e.g., Christine Fellner, The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law, 19 U.
BALT. L. REV. 369 (1989/1990).
91. See Commission Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Community Design, COM (93) 342 final at 9 and Explanatory Memorandum, COM (93) 344 final COD 464, at art. 2 [hereinafter EC Commission's
Explanatory Memorandum]; see also Hugh Griffiths, Overview of Developments in
Europe on Industrial Design Protection, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 359 (1993); Evolution of Design Law, supra note 15, at 397-400; William T.
Fryer, III, InternationalIndustrial Design Law Developments, 4 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 373 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like Protection for Designs, 19 U.
BALT. L. REV. 308, 314-23 (1989/1990); Legislative Agenda, supra note 43, at 29396.
93. See, e.g., Evolution of Design Law, supra note 15, at 392-97 ("appearance
trade dress: from Bonito Boats to Two Pesos"); see generally Designs and New
Technologies, supra note 28, at 81-123 ("concurrent protection of trade dress: the
judge-made design law").
94. See supra note 13; Franz Probst, Protection of Integrated Circuits in Switzerland, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. (E.I.P.R.) 108 (1988).
95. See supra note 13.
96. See supra notes 8, 75-76 and accompanying text.
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single product sold on the general products market carries a
functional design, and current attempts to universalize the
United Kingdom's unregistered design right could, in effect,
protect virtually all save the most commonplace functional
designs.9" Notwithstanding the competitive mandate handed
down from the nineteenth century, the overall trend today is to
override classical free-market premises and to organize in their
stead a system in which virtually every product sold on the
products market comes freighted with the exclusive rights of
intellectual property laws.
In this context, one must cautiously evaluate the prospects
for worldwide competition with respect to intellectual goods
covered by the TRIPS component of the GATT's Uruguay
Round.9" As regards traditional objects of protection that the
Paris and Berne Conventions already governed,9 9 considerable
progress was made in harmonizing international minimum
standards whose competitive effects have withstood the test of
time. In the long run, these achievements should stimulate
greater investment in research and development everywhere,
and they should intensify competition in an integrated world
market.'
At the same time, the TRIPS Agreement has left the
know-how gap afflicting domestic intellectual property systems
largely unaddressed at the international level, as explained
below.'0 ' The protectionist momentum building up in the
sphere of nontraditional innovation will thus continue unabated, if only because special interests can always persuade

97. See, e.g., EC Commission's Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 91, at

18:
Some have expressed concerns that manufacture of certain functional
products may be monopolized by the existence of design rights, these
allegations being based upon the absence of a distinction between aesthetic and functional design. However, experience shows that this distinction is largely arbitrary and that protection for functional designs needs
in any case to be provided for by some means.
(emphasis added).
98. See supra note 82; infra text accompanying notes 104-57.
99. See Berne Convention, supra note 84; Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as last revised, Stockholm, July 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
100. See generally TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 254-66 ("integrating
intellectual property into international economic law").
101. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
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credulous government officials that "protection... needs in
any case to be provided for by some means,"" 2 regardless of
its cumulative anticompetitive effects. Unless timely steps are
taken to deal with the puzzle of applied know-how on its own
terms,0 3 the long-term protectionist tide engulfing nontraditional objects of protection could offset the competitive gains
expected to flow from the harmonization of laws governing
more traditional objects of protection whose relative share of
total investment in research and development seems likely to
decline in the twenty-first century.
III. INTEGRATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
UNFAIR TRADE LAWS IN A POST-GATT REGULATORY REGIME

A. PertinentAchievements of the TRIPS Agreement
The absorption of classical intellectual property law into
international economic law will gradually establish universal
minimum standards governing the relations between innovators and second comers in an integrated world market. 4 As
finalized in December, 1993, the TRIPS component of the
GATT's Uruguay Round falls short of achieving the maximalist
goals that the developed countries hoped to achieve when multilateral trade negotiations began in 1986.0 Rather, it mandates mostly time-tested, basic norms of international intellectual property law as enshrined either in the Paris and Berne
Conventions"' or in equally venerable institutions, such as
trade secret laws, that all developed legal systems recognize in
one form or another. To the extent that the TRIPS Agreement
significantly elevates the level of protection beyond that found
in these Conventions, as certainly occurs with respect to patents, for example, the developing countries have extracted
concessions and safeguards that few would have predicted at
the outset of the negotiations. 7 The following remarks direct

102.
103.
104.
105.
note 5,
ing the
sus).
106.
107.

See supra note 97.
See infra text accompanying notes 190-97.
See TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 173-78, 254-66.
See TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 179-80; GATT Connection, supra
at 869-91 (criticizing maximalist objectives of early initiatives and defendgoal of harmonizing minimum standards that had achieved broad consenSee supra notes 84 & 99.
See generally TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 181-210.
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attention to specific aspects of the TRIPS Agreement that bear
on competition law in general.' 8
1. Limits on the Patent Monopoly
The TRIPS Agreement mandates the extension of patentability to virtually all fields of technology recognized in developed patent systems; it requires patent protection for a uniform term of twenty years; and it secures legal recognition of
the patentee's exclusive right to import the relevant products." 9 The TRIPS Agreement thus largely overrides the obligation to work patents locally, as set out in Article 5A of the
Paris Convention." ° Nevertheless, to the extent that foreign
inventors do not make patented technology available on reasonable terms, the TRIPS Agreement allows domestic governments to take measures to restore the competitive balance.

108. For this writer's analysis of the TRIPS Agreement as a whole, see generally TRIPS Component, supra note 14; Implications of the Draft TRIPS Agreement
for Developing Countries, supra note 74; see also GATT Connection, supra note 5.
109. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 27, 28, 33, 34. The Agreement
further requires member states to protect products obtained directly from a patented process, TRIPS Agreement, supra, art. 28(1)(b), and it makes "patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced." TRIPS Agreement,
supra, art. 27(1). Even those member countries that had not yet adhered to the
Paris Convention, notably India, would have to respect articles 1-12 and 19 of the
Paris Convention in the future. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 2(1). See
Paris Convention, supra note 99, arts. 1-12, 19.
The developing countries' rights to defer implementation of these provisions
vary with the relative economic capacity of the country concerned and with the
subject matter at issue. All developing countries obtain a five-year transition period during which they need not conform domestic laws to the proposed international minimum standards. For the least-developed countries (LDC's), this blanket
exemption lasts ten years and may be extended as circumstances require. See
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 65(1), (2) (allowing developing countries a
five-year transitional period in general), 66 (ten-year exemption requiring LDC's to
provide only national treatment and MFN treatment and to comply with any
WIPO undertakings previously incurred). However, pipeline provisions added at the
last moment seem to require most countries to provide some minimum, interim
protection for existing patents governing "pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical
products." See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 70(8), (9). These provisions
lie beyond the scope of the present study.
110. See Paris Convention, supra note 99,. art. 5A; G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN,
GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 67-73 (1968).
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a. Compulsory Licenses for Unreasonably PricedImports
Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement declares that member
states should tolerate only "limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights" that Article 28 confers. Article 31 nonetheless acknowledges that the domestic laws allow "for other use... without
the authorization of the right holder."' Several provisions of
the TRIPS Agreement then spell out the bases and conditions
for governmentally imposed "other use," and there appears to
be considerable leeway for interpretation.
For example, Article 7 of the Agreement suggests that
regulatory action may be warranted when the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights does not "contribute
to the promotion of... innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users.., and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."
Similarly, Article 8(1) recognizes an overriding need "to protect
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to ...socio-economic and technological development" through measures consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement as a whole. Article 8(2) expressly authorizes
appropriate measures to prevent "abuse of intellectual property
rights.""' Taken together, these articles preserve and expand
potential grounds for limiting a patentee's exclusive rights that
Article 5A of the Paris Convention has long recognized, and
they explicitly entitle developing countries to assimilate concerns about economic development into these limitations."'

111. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 20, 28, 31.
112. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 7, 8.
113. See supra note 110; see also TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 260-66
(discussing relation of these articles to dispute resolution process); infra text accompanying notes 125-28 (discussing abuse in narrow sense of United States law).
Even forfeiture or revocation of the offending patent remains technically feasible
under Article 32 of the TRIPS Agreement, subject to an opportunity for judicial
review. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 32. Forfeiture, however, remains
a drastic remedy that the Paris Convention had already subjected to numerous
limitations and conditions. For example, states could not revoke a patent merely
because the patentee imported the patented products instead of working the patent
locally; nor could states impose forfeiture to rectify "abuse" of the patentee's exclusive rights when a compulsory license would suffice; and a period of compulsory
licensing must normally precede even a justifiable action to revoke on grounds of
abuse. See Paris Convention, supra note 99, art. 5A(1), (3). Forfeiture on other
public-interest grounds remains a theoretical possibility. Cf BODENHAUSEN, supra

1993]

BEYOND THE HISTORICAL LINES

The standard form of remedial action remains compulsory
licensing, as it was under Article 5A of the Paris Convention,
subject to important refinements and conditions that Article 31
of the TRIPS Agreement attempts to introduce."4 In principle, both the public-interest exception and measures to prevent
abuse, respectively stipulated in Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the
TRIPS Agreement, could justify resort to compulsory licensing.
In the past, however, arguments about the meaning of "abuse"
engendered considerable controversy. While a few developed
countries, notably the United States, limit the concept to anticompetitive practices bordering on antitrust violations, most
countries-and a leading commentator-consider the doctrine
of abuse applicable if a patentee fails to work the patent locally in due course or "refuses to grant licenses on reasonable
terms and thereby hampers industrial development, or does
not supply the national market with sufficient quantities of the
patented product, or demands excessive prices for such products.""5

The TRIPS Agreement merges this broader concept of
abuse with the public-interest exception for purposes of compulsory licensing under Articles 8(1) and 8(2). However, considerable effort has been made to discredit the nonworking of
foreign patents locally as a sufficient basis for triggering such
licenses." 6 The TRIPS Agreement then subjects all non-exclusive compulsory licenses sounding in any of the bases established by Article 8 to the conditions of Article 31. The latter
article normally requires a would-be licensee to seek a negotiated license from the right holder and to pay equitable

note 110, at 70 (distinguishing measures required by the public interest from measures to prevent abuse and contending that legislation pertaining to the public
interest was not subject to Article 5A (3), (4) of the Paris Convention). But states
that resort to this remedy in any but the most exceptional circumstances should
expect to elicit protests under the TRIPS dispute settlement framework. See
TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 258-63.
114. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 31.
115. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 110, at 71; cf infra note 125 and accompanying
text.
116. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 8(1) (relating public interest
exception to the promotion of "socia-economic and technological development,"
which overlaps the broader concept of "abuse"); art. 31 (conditions of compulsory
licenses); art. 27(1) (providing that "patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.").
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compensation if these negotiations fail to produce a voluntary
license on reasonable terms and conditions. Article 31 also
imposes restrictions on the exportation of products resulting
from such a nonvoluntary license.'17
Derecognition of the long-standing obligation to work patents locally complements the TRIPS decision to vindicate the
patentee's exclusive right to import the patented products.'
By the same token, the Agreement allows governments directly
to address the primary concern underlying the old local-working requirement, namely, monopolistic pricing." 9 To this end,
Article 31(b) allows member states to impose nonexclusive
compulsory licenses when, despite negotiations with the rights
holders, the latter have failed to license the patented120technology "on reasonable commercial terms and conditions."
The sole exception to the compulsory licenses available
under Article 31(b) is for patented "semiconductor technology."
Article 31(c), as revised at the last minute, now exempts semiconductor technology from compulsory licenses for "other use"
in general, while tolerating compulsory licenses for "public
noncommercial use" or to remedy anti-competitive practic-

es. 121 Unpatented semiconductor layout designs subject to
integrated circuit laws are also immunized from compulsory
licenses for "other use," notwithstanding
contrary provisions in
22
the Washington Treaty.

117. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 31(b)-i).
118. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 28(1)(a).
119. See, e.g., George A. Zaphiriou, Transnational Technology Protection, 40 AM.
J. COMP. L. 879, 889 (1992) (citing authorities); Guillermo Cabanellas, The Consequences of Stricter Working Requirements for Patentees Under the Paris Convention,
19 IIC 158 (1988) (economic arguments against compulsory local working). See also
BLAKENY, supra note 61, at 88-90.

120. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 31(b).
121. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 31(c).
122. Unpatented semiconductor technologies remain subject to the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 35-38 on integrated circuit designs, which are largely
governed by the Washington Treaty, supra note 89. That Treaty did allow developing countries to impose compulsory licenses on semiconductor chip designs for
broad reasons of public interest. See TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 247-49
(citing authorities). However, the Final Act's TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, as
revised at the last moment, expressly refers in art. 37(2) on chip designs to art.
31(c) on patented "semiconductor technology," see supra note 82. In effect, arts.
32(2) of the Washington Treaty and 31(c) of TRIPS, when read together, incorporate an immunity from compulsory licenses for "other use" (but not for "public
noncommercial use" and "anti-competitive practices") into the Washington Treaty.
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Apart from semiconductor technologies, all patented inventions remain subject to compulsory licenses for "other use" if
the conditions of Article 31 are met. While these conditions do
limit the availability of such licenses to some extent, they also
confirm the legitimacy of imposing compulsory licenses to rectify economically unreasonable behavior, especially in regard to
pricing or harsh contractual conditions. 2 3 The requirement
that would-be compulsory licensees negotiate seriously with
rights holders to obtain exclusive licenses on reasonable terms
will thus increase the pressure on foreign patentees to deal on
reasonable terms and to obviate the conditions that lead governments to seek compulsory licensing in the first instance.
b. Other Abuses and the Public-InterestException
As regards measures to prevent abuse in the narrow sense
of the term, Article 31(k) exempts compulsory licenses that
correct "anti-competitive practices" from some of the constraints discussed above, including restrictions on exports of
the resulting products and the duty to negotiate as a precondition of the license, provided that some judicial or administrative body has verified the anticompetitive nature of the practice in question.'2 4 In the United States, such practices border on antitrust violations, and the federal appellate courts
almost always apply a rule of reason.' The European Commission, instead, follows an elaborate set of regulations, built
around block exemptions, that limit licensors of both patents
and know-how in detailed and specified ways. 2 '

123. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 31(a) - (e). Excessive reliance
on this safeguard could eventually elicit claims of impairment and nullification,
whether violatory or nonviolatory in nature. See TRIPS Component, supra note 14,
at 257-58, 261. However, a last-minute concession to the developing countries
seems to have put at least a five-year moratorium on claims of impairment by
nonviolatory acts arising under the TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 82, art. 64 (incorporating by reference Uruguay Round Final Act, supra
note 19, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, MTN/FA II-A2, paragraphs 26.1, 26.2).
124. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 8(2), 31(k).
125. See, e.g., DRATLER, supra note 31, § 2.06[4]; Raskind, supra note 50; 35
U.S.C. § 271(d) (Supp. 1993); see supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. For a similar approach in
Japan, see supra notes 54 & 56.
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The developing countries remain free to pick and choose
among differing regulatory frameworks with a view to proscribing a set of anti-competitive practices that reflect their own
needs and national development strategies."' Whether the
more permissive conditions of Article 31(k) will apply to any
given compulsory license, however, could still depend on unsound distinctions between justifications sounding in "public
interest" and "abuse," on the one hand, and those sounding in
"anti-competitive practices," on the other.'28 To complicate
matters further, Article 8(2) of the TRIPS Agreement expressly
empowers developing countries to adopt appropriate measures
to deal with abusive licensing practices that "adversely affect
the international transfer of technology." Ideally, measures to
implement this provision would emerge from negotiations with
the developed countries, and Article 40.commits both sides to
further consultations concerning measures that adversely affect the transfer of technology, including abuse of intellectual
property rights. 9 Nevertheless, until the present lack of consensus gives way to agreed international standards of competition law,1"' states may continue to rely on unilateral regulatory measures subject to the risk of protest by other, adversely affected states.''
Beyond traditional notions of "public interest" and "abuse,"
the TRIPS Agreement introduces new and more expansive
concepts whose outer limits have yet to be delineated at the
international level. As noted, Article 7 stresses the "promotion
of technological innovation and.., the transfer and dissemination of technology ... in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare." Article 8(1) expands potential public-interest exceptions to sectors other than public health and nutrition
that are "of vital importance to ... socio-economic and technological development," and Article 8(2) seeks to ensure "the
international transfer of technology."'32 In addition, Article
127. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 8(2), 40; Barton et al., supra
note 62, at 211-17; infra text accompanying notes 140-52.
128. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 31(k); see also supra notes 11417 and accompanying text.
129. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 8(2), 40.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 142-52.
131. See TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 256-57 (discussing trade policy
review mechanism of TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 71); see also infra
notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
132. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 7, 8(1), 8(2). These articles
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66 underscores the least-developed countries' "need for flexibility to create a viable technological base," and it must be read in
conjunction with the other provisions favoring this group of
countries.'33
All these provisions arm the developing countries with
legal bases for maintaining a considerable degree of domestic
control over intellectual property policies in a post-TRIPS environment. While the meaning of any particular clause must
emerge from evolving state practice, taken together they clearly sanction public-interest exceptions of importance to the
developing countries while rejecting the more extreme measures these countries proposed during the Paris Revision process.' Eventually, specific public-interest safeguards essential to national economic development will have to be worked
out on a case-by-case basis, in order to deal with particular
complaints about the socially harmful effects of technological
dependency that are not offset by enhanced market access, and
the resulting compromises are likely to give both sides less
than they want.
2. Anticounterfeiting Measures and Border Controls
The TRIPS Agreement commits both developed and developing countries to border-control measures to repress imports
of counterfeit goods.' The imposition of border controls for
these purposes represents one of the most legitimate and
promising results of the TRIPS exercise, provided that states
implement the necessary measures in a nondiscriminatory
fashion and do not erect disguised barriers to trade. 3 ' Such
must be correlated with dispute resolution procedures under the TRIPS Agreement; see TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 260-62.
133. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 66(1); TRIPS Component, supra
note 14, at 256, 258-59. The principle of differential and more favorable treatment
for Least-Developed Countries (as distinct from developing countries under U.N.
practice) was reinforced at the last moment. See Uruguay Round, Final Act, supra
note 19, Decision on Measures in Favor of Least-Developed Countries, Dec. 15.
1993, MTN/FA III-1.
134. See GATT Connection, supra note 5, at 817 n.315 (citing authorities).
135. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 41 (general obligations as to
the enforcement of intellectual property rights), 46, 51-61, 69 (special requirements
related to border control measures and counterfeit goods), 51 n.14 (defining, for
purposes of border control measures, "counterfeit trademark" and "pirated copyright
goods").
136. See, e.g., Robert W. Kastenmeier & David W. Beier, International Trade
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measures will succeed only so long as the participating states
enforce them vigilantly, which will require both developed and
developing countries to curb powerful vested interests. If, instead, the enforcement machinery in any given country breaks
down despite the risk of sanctions by adversely affected states,
it will undermine the overall effectiveness of the transnational
system that the Agreement envisioned.
3. Trade Secrets and Confidential Information
The TRIPS Agreement will eventually require all member
countries to protect undisclosed information under some form
of trade secret law (or equivalent confidentiality laws).'3 7 A
systematic failure to provide trade secret protection should
thus become actionable at the international level as a distinct
component of the international regime of unfair competition
law already regulated by Article lObis of the Paris Convention.
However, unlike past violations of the Paris Convention, which
never led to litigation between states, future violations of Article l0bis would become justiciable within the revised disputeresolution machinery of the GATT itself."8
At bottom, the trade secret provisions of the TRIPS Agreement impose no greater burdens on entrepreneurs in developing countries than on small- and medium-sized firms in developed countries while entitling them all to lead-time protection
against unethical conduct and industrial espionage. To operate
successfully under this regime, unlicensed entrepreneurs in
developing countries must learn to acquire unpatented foreign
technology through self-help methods of reverse-engineering
rather than by improper means that avoid any contribution to
the global costs of research and development. This task, facilitated by the availability of technical engineering skills on the
global labor market, tends to root the technology in the local

and Intellectual Property: Promise, Risks, and Reality, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
285, 297-98 (1989) (noting need for U.S. to eliminate discriminatory effects of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)); GATT Connection,
supra note 5, at 829-39 (discussing GATT's Article XX(d), which forbids the use of
intellectual property norms as disguised barriers to trade), 887-89 (discussing current pressures on Article XX(d)).
137. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 39 (section is entitled "Protection of Undisclosed Information").
138. See supra note 123; TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 258-63 (discussing nullification and impairment of benefits under the TRIPS Agreement).

BEYOND THE HISTORICAL LINES

1993]

107

culture and to provide a basis for future research and
development as well as export potential. Trade secret protection benefits innovators everywhere and, as elsewhere explained, it could greatly stimulate the licensing of foreign technology to developing countries by reducing both transaction
costs and risk aversion. 13 9
4. Licensing and Unfair Competition in General
One of the general principles established in Article 8 of the
TRIPS Agreement is the right of states to adopt appropriate
measures "to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights
by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably
restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology."" This principle then acquires greater specificity
in regard to both patents, as previously discussed, and trademarks. As regards the latter, states "may determine conditions
on the licensing and assignment of trademarks," but are no
longer permitted to impose compulsory licenses on trademark
proprietors."
Article 40 of the TRIPS Agreement recognizes the legitimacy of controlling anti-competitive practices in contractual
licenses affecting intellectual property rights generally.'
However, Article 40(1) acknowledges the lack of consensus in
this area m by admitting that states agree only "that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property rights... restrain competition" and "may have adverse
effects on trade and may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology."'4 The general right of member states to
regulate licensing agreements, already set out in article 8, is
then reformulated in Article 40(2) so as to allow single states
to legislate against "licensing practices or conditions that may
in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant

139.
140.
141.
82, art.
142.
143.
144.

See
See
See
21.
See
See
See

TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 236-39 (citing authorities).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 8(2) (emphasis added).
supra text accompanying notes 112-34; TRIPS Agreement, supra note
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 40 and title to Section 8.
supra notes 115 & 125-26 and accompanying text.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 40(1).
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market."'45 Evidently, this provision attempts to address the
kinds of abuse that developed countries normally recognize, "' without necessarily limiting the developing countries
from proceeding on other grounds either under the formulation
of Article 8 or under broader principles inherent in the objectives set out in Article 7 and in the public-interest exception
set out in Article 8(1). 1 7 Even with regard to abuse in the
narrow sense of Article 40(2), the negotiators could only agree
to name "exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing
challenges to validity and coercive package licensing"
8 as examples of practices that states may legislate against.1
Given this lack of consensus and its attendant soft-law
approach, the logical solution was to require consultations
when conflicts occur. In this respect Article 40(3) cuts two
ways. It allows developing countries in particular cases to
request information from developed countries that bears on alleged violations of local regulations, which could embarrass the
alleged violator before his own government. 5 ° But it also allows developed countries to demand consultations when they
view the local action or regulations as exceeding the mandate
of Article 40.151

The likely consequence of these provisions is a further
round of talks in which both sides try to establish a greater
consensus concerning actions to restrain misuse of intellectual
property rights.'52 Indeed, the express legitimization of a demand for consultations to deal with questionable regulatory
acts appears to mandate further negotiations along these lines,
even if the uncertain application of antitrust principles to intellectual property rights in the developed countries themselves casts doubt on the efficacy of such negotiations.
Meanwhile, with specific regard to unfair competition law
as distinct from antitrust in general and misuse in particular,
one should not overlook the fact that the TRIPS Agreement

145. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 8, 40(2).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 46-59.
147. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, arts. 7, 8(1).
148. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 40(2).
149. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 40(3), (4).
150. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 40(3).
151. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 40(3), (4).
152. See infra text accompanying notes 173-74; TRIPS Component, supra note
14, at 264-66.
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incorporates Article lObis of the Paris Convention by
reference.'53 Article lObis proscribes acts "contrary to honest
practices in industrial commercial matters" as established in
international trade.'54 A consensus exists regarding traditional acts of passing off and related activities sounding in the deception or confusion of consumers, which are addressed by
Lanham Act section 43(a) in the United States. 5 While the
outer limits of Article lObis remain to be clarified, and some
scholars fear that unfair competition law in general is not yet
ripe for harmonization,156 states that continue to tolerate
practices that blatantly deceive or confuse consumers with
regard to foreign products could find themselves embroiled in
the dispute-settlement procedures established in the Uruguay
Round.'57
B. Future Projects and a Major Omission
1. The Draft International Antitrust Code
In all countries, efforts to implement higher intellectual
property standards will increase the strain on related aspects
of competition law that are not directly covered by the TRIPS
Agreement. Identifying the parameters of healthy competition
valid for all players in an integrated world market will thus
become a pressing task for the international community in a
post-TRIPS economic environment.'58 Yet, this task has

153. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 2(1) (incorporating minimum
standards of Paris Convention, supra note 99).
154. See Paris Convention, supra note 99, art. l0bis(2); BODENHAUSEN, supra
note 110, at 144.
155. See Paris Convention, supra note 99, art. l0bis(3) [1], [2], [3]; Lanham Act
§ 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
,156. See, e.g., Gerhard Schricker, European Harmonization of Unfair Competition Law-A Futile Venture?, 156 IIC 788 (1991).
157. See TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 258-63.
158. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 1, passim; John H. Jackson, GATT and
the Future of International Trade Institutions, 18 BROOK. J. INTL L. 11, 24 (1992)
(stressing that monopolies "can undo the trade liberalization effect of reduced tariffs and nontariff barriers."); see also John H. Jackson, Statement on Competition
and Trade Policy Before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1992), reprinted in 26 J. WORLD TRADE 110 (1992); David P. Fidler, Competition Law and
International Relations, 41 INTL & COA1P. L.Q. 563 (1992). Although the TRIPS
Agreement recognizes numerous exceptions to intellectual property rights for purposes of enhancing competition, see supra text accompanying notes 124-52, it never
addresses the meaning of competition or the tenets of competition law.
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become more complicated than ever because innovators, users,
and second comers all have different stakes in fashioning the
rules of fair competition applicable to an integrated world
market, and their interests will increasingly vary more with
their economic roles than with the geopolitical affiliations of
their respective national states.
Over time, indeed, competition under the new rules of a
TRIPS Agreement may gradually blur the national boundaries
that have proved so disruptive in the present negotiations. For
example, the affinities between small- and medium-sized firms
in both developed and developing countries may eventually
outweigh the affinities between small and large firms operating within a single national territory. Interests shared
transnationally should, in turn, make it dangerous for states to
allow domestic oligopolists to control future negotiations on
either intellectual property rights or competition law to the
extent they controlled the recent multilateral trade negotiations bearing on TRIPS. Developed countries that too aggressively seek to define competition law in terms acceptable to
their oligopolistic exporters could hurt those small- and medium-sized firms that are the real engines of innovation at home.
Developing countries that overly regulate the large firms operating in their territories could render the business climate less
hospitable to their own small- and medium-sized firms.
In any event, antitrust law must remain an integral part
of ongoing international discussions of intellectual property
rights,'59 even if doubts persist concerning the ability of
states to harmonize unfair competition laws as such. 6 To
this end, an intrepid group of scholars, organized by Professor
Ernst-TUlrich Petersmann, has undertaken to elaborate a Draft
International Antitrust Code to be submitted to the GATT's
legislative body for future consideration. 6 '
159. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier, The Prospects for Intellectual Property in GATT,
28 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 383, 410 (1991). For one authoritative assessment of the
case for and against harmonization, and of the difficulties attendant upon an affirmative answer, see the excellent article by Prof. Petersmann, supra note 1, at 5978.
160. See Schricker, supra note 156.
161. See Working Group, International Antitrust Code, Draft InternationalAntitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade Agreement, Munich, Germany, July
10, 1993, reprinted in 5 WoRLD TRADE MATERAIs 126 (1993) [hereinafter Draft
Antitrust Code] (signed by Dr. Joseph Drexl, Prof. Wolfgang Fikentscher, Prof.
Eleanor M. Fox, Dr. Andreas Fuchs, Andreas Heinemann, Prof. Ullrich Immenga,
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While the bulk of their recommendations lie beyond the
scope of this Article, the Working Group's proposals in regard
to "Restraints in Connection with Intellectual Property Rights"
deserve mention here.' A first set of relevant proposals in
Article 6, which consider the application of general principles
of antitrust law, rather tamely restate the drafters' preferred
interpretation of existing European Union law. 6 3 Rather

than elaborating a concept of misuse as such, the Draft International Antitrust Code emphasizes the legitimacy of exercising "an intellectual property right within the limits of the legal
content of such rights" so as not to "entail restraints of competition."' It does prohibit abuse of a dominant position by obtaining or exercising intellectual property rights, and it also
prohibits pooling these rights "to suppress technology or raise
prices.
On the topic of licensing in general, the Draft Antitrust
Code stresses the legitimate purposes of licensing more than
the grounds for determining misuse, and it expressly authorizes "licenses which may be exclusive and territorially restricted"
as well as the imposition of other "justified obligations and
restrictions."66 In the same vein, the comments to the Draft
Code take pains to specify the kinds of presumably permissible
clauses that licensors could insert in a typical agreement covering the licensing of patented products and processes. These
include obligations to produce goods and services "necessary" to
exploit the invention; minimum royalty and quantity terms;
field of use restrictions; restrictions on sublicensing and assignments; and obligations to use the licensor's mark. Also
allowed are obligations not to divulge the licensor's know-how
even after expiration of the patent if the know-how remains
secret; to cooperate with regard to infringement actions and to
observe quality standards; to "grant one another a non-exclusive license in respect of inventions relating to improvements

Dr. Hans Peter Kunz-Hallstein, Prof. Ernst-Ullrich Petersmann, Prof. Walter R.
Schluep, Prof. Akira Shoda, Prof. Stanislaw J. Soltysinki, and Prof. Lawrence A.
Sullivan); see also Petersmann, supra note 1, at 78-83.
162. See Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 161, at 31-35.
163. Compare Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 161, art. 6, § 1(a), (b), (c), at
156-57 with Korah, supra note 4.
164. See Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 161, art. 6, § 1(a).
165. See Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 161, art. 6, § 1(b) (c).
166. See Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 161, art. 6, § 2.
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and new applications;" and a "most-favored" terms clause to
keep licensees on an equal footing.'67
The only illegal acts the Draft Code expressly recognizes in
the licensing context are obligations "not to challenge the validity of the licensed right" and "to respect the license right
even though [the patent] may have expired."' Even these
provisions may be "found reasonable in a particular case."6 9
On the whole, however, the licensor who strays too far from
the approved conditions set out above becomes subject to a rule
of reason, and must "bear the burden of proof' that he or she
has not exceeded the legal scope of the exclusive rights in
question. 7 °
To its credit, the Draft Code recognizes know-how licenses
as a special class and, in their regard, expressly authorizes
both exclusive territorial restraints and other "justified obligations and restrictions." 7 ' The Draft Code does not further
specify the nature of these permissible obligations and restrictions, although it forbids licensors from obliging licensees "not
to use the licensed know-how at the end of the agreement...
if... [it] has become public knowledge for any other reason
than a breach of contract committed by the licensee." 72 A
rule of reason thus seems to apply in most cases.
While these proposals would prove too conservative for
many observers even in developed countries, they are manifestly at odds with the approaches favored at different times by
the developing countries. 73 Yet, the developing countries will
require the cooperation of the developed countries in formulating guidelines for the licensing of both patented and unpatented technologies in order to effectuate transfers of technology
without unduly discouraging direct foreign investment. If, in
future negotiations, the developing countries proved willing to
exchange greater short-term protection of innovative products
embodying unpatented know-how for a commitment by the

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Draft Antitrust
Draft Antitrust
Draft Antitrust
Draft Antitrust
Draft Antitrust
Draft Antitrust

Code, supra note
Code, supra note
Code, supra note
Code, supra note
Code, supra note
Code, supra note

161,
161,
161,
161,
161,
161,

art. 6, cmt. 3.
art. 6, cmt. 5.
at 160.
art. 6, cmt. 6.
art. 6, § 3.
art. 6, § 3.

173. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; Barton et al., supra note 62, at
208-17; see generally STEPHEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN
AND DOMEsTIc OPERATIONS, chs. 26-45 (rev. ed. 1994).
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industrialized countries to support an International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, it might open a new
chapter in international competition law.'7 4
2. The Know-How Gap in TRIPS
Meanwhile, a major shortcoming of the TRIPS Agreement
is that it reproduces at the international level the very knowhow gap that, as was demonstrated earlier, continues to plague
all the domestic laws underlying the existing international
intellectual property system.'7 5 This follows largely because
the United States negotiators, blinded by a particular view of
the cathedral, confined their efforts to securing copyright protection for electronic information tools under the aegis of the
Berne Convention without considering the need for supplementary forms of relief lying outside copyright and trade secret
laws in their present form.'7 6 In this way, the copyright approach to computer programs was not buttressed by any corresponding understanding with the developing countries that
would prevent or retard imitation of the noncopyrightable,
unpatented components of computer programs that become
embodied in material supports sold on the open market.77
To be sure, if oligopolistic suppliers could fully control the
elaboration of their domestic copyright laws, these laws would
become de facto industrial property laws capable of protecting
even the structural components of computer programs primarily responsible for functional behavior. Some early decisions
leaned in this direction. 78 Beginning in the late 1980s, however, numerous legal scholars, both individually and collectively, declared that traditional copyright principles (as recently

174. Cf GATT Connection, supra note 5, at 870-72, 875-78; supra note 61; see
infra text accompanying notes 179-84.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
176. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 82, art. 10 (section is entitled "Computer Programs and Compilations of Data."); TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at
224-25, 229-35.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
178. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1986) (broad copyright protection for elements of structure, sequence and organization), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990): Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything
New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 106 (1993) (approving this trend).
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reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court) prevented
software producers from obtaining patent-like protection of
either program function or standardized components of user
interfaces through the back door.'79 A spate of decisions recently handed down by the federal appellate courts tend to
uphold this thesis by significantly reducing the range of program elements likely to qualify as copyrightable
expression.' Still other decisions now permit second comers
to make intermediate copies of an originator's object code for
purposes of reverse-engineering noncopyrightable ideas or
components that they cannot reasonably discover by other
means, so long as the second comers independently create their
own end products without embodying the originators'
protectible expression."'
Copyright protection of computer programs in the United
States still prevents the wholesale duplication of any given

179. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 65; Programs as Know-How, supra note
11, at 691-93, 693 n.288; Menell, supra note 15; Kaijala, supra note 15.
180. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir.
1993); Computer Assocs., Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992);
Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992); Plains
Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Servs., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1987). See generally Dennis S. Karjala, Recent United States and InternationalDevelopments in Software Protection (pts. 1 & 2), 16 E.I.P.R. 13, 58 (1994); Randall
Davis, The Nature of Software and Its Consequences for Establishing and Evaluating Similarity, 5 SOFTWARE L. J. 299 (1992).
181. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992 );
Atari Games, Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). These
cases hold that when circumstances unduly restrict access to the noncopyrightable
elements of a computer program, it is fair use for a potential competitor to
decompile publicly distributed object code in order to reconstruct the originator's
undisclosed source code, so long as the second comer's end product does not embody the originator's protected expression and there is no misappropriation of
trade secrets or any breach of fiduciary obligations. This result follows from new
and old Supreme Court decisions that prevent the exclusive reproduction rights of
copyright law from indirectly protecting unpatented technical ideas, principles,
processes, systems or methods of operation, which third parities must remain free
to reverse engineer. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 161-64 (1989) (stressing competitor's right to reverse engineer unpatented
products); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Programs as Know-How, supra
note 11, at 691-93, 693 n.288. Whether the European Communities' Directive on
Software also allows reverse engineering for purposes of analytical use in addition
to interoperability remains to be seen. See, e.g., BRIDGET CZARNOTA & ROBERT J.
HART, LEGAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS IN EUROPE-A GUIDE TO THE

EC DIRECTIVE 73-86 (1991); Linda G. Morrison, Note, The EC Directive on the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs: Does It Leave Room for Reverse Engineering Beyond the Need for Interoperability?, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1992).
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program, and especially its code, much like unfair competition
law appears to do in Germany. But neither copyright nor trade
secret laws prevent reimplementation of functionally equivalent behavior by proper means, nor will these laws impede
second comers in developing countries from using components
that are functionally determined or that constitute either stanor market-determined standards of efficiency in the trade
182
dards that consumers require.
Moreover, the same know-how gap likely to perpetuate a
chronic state of underproduction for computer programs also
applies to many products of biogenetic engineering, to industrial designs, and to other important new technologies that
rest mainly on advances in applied know-how rather than on
patentable discoveries. 8 ' Although the need for some
provisory, transnational "gentlemen's agreement" covering the
duplication of unpatented, noncopyrightable embodiments of
applied know-how was pointed out in 1 9 8 9 ,M and there is
evidence that the developing countries might have acquiesced
in such an interim solution, the developed countries' negotiators took no steps in this direction.
As a result, the pressures on domestic courts and legislators to fill a gap in the world's intellectual property system will
grow more acute as the century draws to an end. Legislators,
in particular, will find it tempting to throw more ill-conceived
sui generis laws at this moving target; while both courts and
legislators struggling to adapt nineteenth century economic
principles to twenty-first century innovation may continue to
expand the misappropriation branch of unfair competition law
with no firm analytical or economic foundations to support
their endeavors. The protectionist tide discussed earlier in this
Article will thus continue to rise unless timely steps are taken
to develop a new intellectual property paradigm capable of
5
dealing with applied scientific know-how on its own terms. 8
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185.
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supra notes 179-80; TRIPS Component, supra note 14, at 229-35.
supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
GATT Connection, supra note 5, at 875-78.
supra text accompanying notes 82-103; infra notes 190-97.
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IV. BEYOND THE HISTORICAL LINES OF DEMARCATION
The foregoing discussion suggests that scholars and lawmakers must avoid two dogmas when considering the application of antitrust principles to the exercise of intellectual property rights in a post-industrial environment. One dogma to
avoid is that antitrust and intellectual property laws promote
inherently antithetical goals. The other, equally misleading
dogma is that antitrust laws should treat intellectual property
rights just like any other form of property."8 6 Instead, enlightened policy making for an information age"' requires an
awareness of the peculiar properties of intangibility, indivisibility, and inexhaustibleness 8 ' that led nineteenth century
scholars to recognize "intellectual property" as a distinctive
class of rights that differed from other kinds of property familiar from Roman law." 9 Starting from this premise, scholars
and lawmakers must further combine principles drawn from
heretofore artificually disarticulated legal subcultures-including intellectual property law, unfair competition
law, trade secret law, and antitrust law-into a unified regulatory framework that implements a coherent innovation policy.
To this end, two works-in-progress explore the theoretical
and practical foundations of a third legal paradigm that looks
beyond "art" and "inventions" in order to address the protection of applied know-how as such, and they develop a concrete
model for adapting this theory to the protection of

186. See, e.g., Charles Rule, Monopoly Power and Intellectual Property Rights
Under United States Antitrust Law, Address at the Symposium on Intellectual
Property Rights and Competition Law, Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, New York
(April 15, 1994) (unpublished).
187. See, e.g. STEPHEN SAXBY, THE AGE OF INFORMATION-THE PAST DEVELOPMENT AND FUTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATIONS 1-41, 85-146
(1991).

188. "Indivisibility" refers to the "public good" characteristic of information: No
one person's consumption diminishes its availability to others. See, e.g., BENKO,
supra note 2, at 21 (stressing that "knowledge goods . .. create problems of market failure, externalities, and appropriability");WILLIAM KINGSTON, INNOVATION,
CREATIVITY AND LAW 83-85 (1990); Ejan Mackaay, An Economic View of Information Law, in INFORMATION LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 43-65 (Willem F.
Korthals Altes et al. eds., 1992).
189. See 1 STEPHEN LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 1-12 (1938) (noting that term "intelletual property" was not
coined until the nineteenth century, when Kohler and Picard perceived that artistic and industrial property laws had more in common with each other than with
the older forms of property known to Roman law).
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noncopyrightable, unpatented components of computer programs.19 Since both works will soon be published, it suffices
to indicate some of the underlying conceptual foundations
pertinent to the topic at hand.
The more one examines the various hybrid legal regimes
that have lately proliferated in the widening gap between the
international patent and copyright systems, 9 ' the more one
is struck by their makeweight natures and by the lack of any
conceptual, economic, or empirical rationales capable of justifying the social costs of any known regime of exclusive property
rights operating outside these dominant paradigms. If one then
re-examines the way in which unpatented, noncopyrightable
know-how is actually transferred from the laboratory to industry, one is struck by the lattice work of individual contractual
transactions that do the work and by the accumulated transaction costs their repetition continues to engender. Because these
two-party deals may unduly limit the public's right to reverseengineer the know-how in question, the regulatory burden of
defending that interest adds considerably to these transaction
' Where administrators neglect this regulatory burden,
costs. "92
as often occurs in the United States, the transaction costs are
shifted to courts, which must police these bargains case-bycase, or to consumers at large, who defray the true costs of the
many contractually imposed barriers to entry that go unregulated. Where, instead, the regulation of know-how transfer
agreements becomes too intrusive, as arguably occurs in the
European Union, a casuistic administrative approach adds so
much to overall transaction costs as to become both inefficient
and laxly enforced in the end.'
The solution to the problem of legal protection for applied
scientific know-how thus turns, in the first instance, on the
stipulation of a standard, off-the-rack contractual deal applicable to eligible forms of innovation. The standard deal would
confer a minimum but sufficient degree of lead-time protection
on investment in unpatented innovation while encouraging

190. See Legal Hybrids, supra note 7; Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis,
Mitchell Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 82-95.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 46-81.
193. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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second comers to make efficient decisions about further investment in incremental innovation without regard to the barriers
to entry characteristic of exclusive property rights. Besides
providing those who develop "incremental innovation bearing
know-how on its face" with artificial lead time,'94 the standard deal must also guarantee the public's right to adapt and
extend these same innovations, either by lawful forms of reverse-engineering or by substitute legal transactions that require some contribution to the technical community's overall
costs of research and development. The standard contractual
deal would, in effect, operate erga omnes, in the sense that its
provisions would bind all second comers once innovators satisfied minimum eligibility requirements. But its legal machinery
would tend to promote competition, rather than impede it, and
it would not provide monopolistic incentive structures in the
manner of traditional intellectual property rights."5
The proper aim of a standard know-how deal is to stimulate competition by avoiding market failure; by regulating the
pace and direction of reverse-engineering, and defining its
lawful characteristics; and by encouraging second comers to
continue the process of incremental innovation in exchange for
a contractually imposed contribution to the overall cost of research and development. 9 Such a regime would thus combine elements of classical trade secret law with elements of
competition law, without introducing more exclusive property
rights than already exist; and it would blur the lines of demarcation that artificially separate intellectual property law from
its sister legal subcultures under traditional modes of analysis.
The primary objective is to provide a minimum period of artificial lead time in order to avoid both the market failure and the
unjust enrichment problems that currently afflict know-how
applied to industrial products sold on the general products
market.'97 While the market would continue to determine the
value of unpatented innovation, originators could not erect
barriers to entry nor could second comers free-ride on the
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supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
generally Legal Hybrids, supra note 7.
generally Legal Hybrids, supra note 7.
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; see also Gordon, supra note
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investment in research and development that the technological
community as a whole requires for its sustenance.
Those who find these principles of interest are invited to
examine the forthcoming works-in-progress and to participate
in this endeavor by providing constructive criticism. However
adventurous such proposals may seem at first glance, they are
less radical by far than the present penchant for expanding
and multiplying exclusive property rights in every direction.
There is no avoiding the issue, no clinging to obsolete legal
solutions without unacceptably high costs to the developed
countries' comparative advantage in the field of high technology. No matter how uncertain and difficult it will be to develop
a law that appropriately protects applied know-how, the unknown risks it entails are outweighed by the greater risks
inherent in continuing to adapt existing legal institutions to
new technologies for which they are inherently unsuited.
As matters stand, rather than facing up to the new problems that might arise from efforts to devise a regime to protect
applied know-how as such, the world's intellectual property
community is witnessing both the destabilization of its
paradigmatic foundations, as patent, copyright and trademark
systems mutate in unexpected ways under the pressure of
events, and a proliferation of legal hybrids that mock the competitive ethos. Sooner or later, unless these tendencies are
resisted in the interest of a more rational and constructive
debate, a discredited intellectual property system risks collapsing of its own protectionist weight.

